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BAR BRIEFS

jury. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appealed, alleging error in the
court's denial of requested instruction. HELD: Reversed. Where one
who is a guest or passenger in an automobile contributes to the causes
of the collision, by over-crowding or similiar acts, it is a question for
the jury to determine whether such passenger is guilty of contributory
negligence so as to preclude recovery. Where there is a collision between the car in which one is such guest or passenger and another
vehicle such passenger cannot recover from the owner or driver of
the other car for injuries sustained in the collision between the two
cars if the negligence of the driver of the car in which he is a passenger is the cause of the collision, even if the driver of the other car
be guilty of contributory negligence.-A. E. A.
THE FIRST REACTION
The following is the first reaction to a recent item in Bar Briefs.
It was submitted by J. E. Skulstad, of Maddock:
"I note in your issue of Bar Briefs for October that lawyers
have not come to an agreement as to the advisability of judges commenting on the weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses in jury
cases, and that you quote expressions, from 'rather authoritative
sources,' help matters along. Thank you.
"Of these expressions the one by Dean Pond appears to me quite
original, and may prove particularly profitable (?) to the Bar in our
deliberations on these subjects. Taking it in connection with your
announced stand by laymen and legislators we might, as concerns our
state courts, be, satisfied as it is. There the privilege of comment in
this particular is ours. Take the judges in on it and our final and
usually most noted effort on the trial may be badly shattered and its
effect to ourself, our clients, the 'pioneer community' et als, fatally
impaired. Beside, we may in effect have a directed verdict.
"On the other hand, in due seriousness, and in view of the purpose of the trial and the ultimate dispensation of justice, the wisdom
of the practice to submit these delicate and often intricate problems
exclusively to the decision of twelve men or women of not more than
average intelligence, must be assumed repugnant to higher intelligence.
Assuming further that competence to deal with these problems is not
a gift to man, but must be acquired by close study and observation,
it fairly follows that, as concerns such competence, the prehistoric
caveman might compare as favorably to the average juror as does
the latter to the trial judge. And in justice to the trial judge, may
we not conceive of a situation particularly humiliating to him, when,
with hands tied, he sees justice in danger of miscarriage?
"Hence, and with permission, whenever there is anything in or about
evidence or witnesses, material to the arrival at a just verdict, patent
to the judge, but which he has reason to believe abstruse or, maybe,
hidden to the jury, he should not only have the right to shed light on
it, but it should be his duty; in order that a high degree of care be
exercised with a view to- enable the jury to perform its function
intelligently."

